“What Arises from This?”: The Autostereogrammatical in Thomas Pynchon's Mason & Dixon by Jordan, J
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=vcrt20
Download by: [University College London] Date: 28 September 2015, At: 07:57
Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction
ISSN: 0011-1619 (Print) 1939-9138 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vcrt20
“What Arises from This?”: The
Autostereogrammatical in Thomas Pynchon's
Mason & Dixon
Julia Jordan
To cite this article: Julia Jordan (2015) “What Arises from This?”: The Autostereogrammatical in
Thomas Pynchon's Mason & Dixon, Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 56:3, 270-283,
DOI: 10.1080/00111619.2014.897932
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00111619.2014.897932
Copyright Julia Jordan
Published online: 13 May 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 192
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Critique, 56:270–283, 2015
Published with license by Taylor & Francis
ISSN: 0011-1619 print/1939-9138 online
DOI: 10.1080/00111619.2014.897932
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“What Arises from This?”: The Autostereogrammatical in
Thomas Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon
The figure of the autostereogram recurs with frequency in Mason & Dixon. It invokes a particular
mode of seeing and provides a new model by which we might read the novel and its central
preoccupations: bifocularity, layering, lines, haunting, and encryption. This essay argues that
Pynchon’s text is thus informed by an autostereogrammatical paradox, promising secretion in
depth, while simultaneously celebrating the opacity of the surface.
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On the first page of Thomas Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon is a description of an optical illusion.
“A sinister and wonderful Card Table,” we are told, causes “an illusion of Depth into which for
years children have gaz’d as into the illustrated Pages of Books” (1). The illusion occurs when
the flat surface of the desk suddenly, generously gives way to multiplying visible layers. The
image is conjured by the “Wave-like Grain” of the wood, where laminar lines of the fibres run
in curvaceous rows, and is held below the surface of the desk like a secret. The layers of the
desk, akin to the “so many hinges, sliding Mortises, hidden catches, and secret compartments”
(1), present us with an accretion of visual complexity, both sinister and wonderful.
Later in the novel Tom Hynes is staring at some wallpaper when he also experiences an optical
illusion. The wallpaper, just like the grain of the wood, consists of parallel columns: it is “pattern’d
all over with identical small blue Flowers,” in a “floral repetition,” and as Tom is staring at the
wallpaper this duplication gives way to depth (Pynchon 583). Tom, like the children, is gazing
passively—he is “doing nothing”—but this passive visual consumption subverts the authority of
the pattern on the wall; he “lets his eyes drift out of Focus,” an inattention that seems the spur
to what comes next: “He finds that if he comes close enough to the Wall, and lets his eye drift
slightly out of Focus, each Blossom will divide in two and these slide away to each Side, until
re-combining into a Neighbour” (583). The images then become suspended above the supposedly
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“What Arises from This?” 271
real level of the picture plane: “the new-made images appear now to have Depth, making an
Array of Solid Objects suspended in a quivering bright Aether” (583). The “solid objects” reveal
three-dimensionality, occupying air that quivers in support around them. Here, passivity has been
the spur to participation: between the viewer and the viewed, a third element has thrust upward,
seemingly autonomously, but actually in symbiosis with the viewer’s gaze.
This specific and particular mode of seeing, which recurs frequently in the text, seems to
describe explicitly the experience of successfully looking at an autostereogram.1 The autostere-
ogram, or “magic eye” picture, is an arrangement of small, horizontally repeating patterns within
a screen of randomly scattered dots, from which, if looked at in the right way, a seemingly hidden
image will emerge in three dimensions out of the picture. There are two ways of successfully
looking at an autostereogram. In the first, the two lines of sight from either eye converge above
the image; in the other, they converge beyond it or below it. These two methods of seeing an
autostereogram correctly are thus either known as wall-eyed and cross-eyed, or convergent and
divergent. To achieve either view, the brain has to overcome its desire to focus, or to converge
at the point of the image. This moment of revelation, where images become multilayered and
munificent, is known as parallax. The autostereogram thus offers a model of vision where the
image itself seems to be an agent: we can provoke it, we can coax it, but nothing is guaranteed; the
autostereogram asks us to consider whether two perspectives, if converged on correctly, can give
way to a previously hidden third element—by dint of its revelatory structure, the autostereogram
is naturally epiphanic.2
Mason and Dixon & Mason & Dixon: Bifocularity and the Parallactic Reading
As astronomer and surveyor, respectively, Pynchon’s historical Charles Mason and Jeremiah
Dixon offer dual perspectives on their task, which is to map the transits of Venus. They are
subsequently sent to settle a boundary dispute between two American colonies by forces of which
they have little knowledge; their judgment on the dispute of course results in the Mason-Dixon
line. A boundary dispute means that two different perceptions of a mark are in conflict, but Mason
and Dixon instead negotiate between their dual perspectives to reach certainty, knowledge, and
consensus. Mason & Dixon is thus a novel much concerned with bifocularity and its implications.
Mason and Dixon’s doubled perspective successfully results in a single, powerful, irreducible
visual mark; a line across the earth that is both material and immaterial; a boundary marker
and a performative enactment of the mastery of nature by two representative Enlightenment
activities—surveying and astronomy. The dual perspectives, embodied by Mason and Dixon, have
epistemological as well as ethical ramifications: their doubled status in the novel, the differences
between them—introverted Mason with his predilection for wine-drinking and communing with
ghosts, and extroverted Dixon, who advocates reason and progress with a genial equanimity—and
their friendship as “Lens-brothers” comprise the source of their scopic and moral power.3
The autostereogram, then, provides a new model by which we might read Mason & Dixon:
it is the dominant metaphor of the novel, and it offers ways of thinking about the novel’s
central preoccupations: bifocularity, layering, lines, haunting, the relationship between vertical
and horizontal axes, and encryption. Furthermore, it throws new light on the experience of
reading Pynchon, because the model of the autostereogram destabilizes binary conceptions of
depth value. The text is informed, this essay will argue, by an autostereogrammatical paradox,
promising profundity in depth while actually inscribing on the surface: a horizontal complexity
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272 Critique
operating with an illusion of vertical dimensionality. On one hand, the autostereogram disturbs
our assumption that meaning resides in depth—in what is buried and latent—by creating a hyper-
determined surface; the depth that it promises to disclose literally exists on the surface. We
know as a viewer of the autostereogram, and as a reader of fiction, that depth is an illusion, and
that both interpretative acts are therefore a mode of play, where the delight and vitality of the
depthless, glittering surface is allowed to be all. But simultaneously, the autostereogram lives up
to its promise, sharing its secrets and showing what was previously hidden. The surface is less
meaningful than the image it obscures; and yet because it comprises the profundity of what is
immanent, an architectural complexity of surface obtains, or a “radicality [: : : ] of ‘flatness”’ in
Sanford Kwinter’s phrase (129).4 By playing with our assumptions concerning the correlation
of depth and significance, Mason & Dixon offers a postmodern defense of exuberant surface
complexity and play, while endorsing our expectations of hidden meanings, asking us to look
beyond while simultaneously celebrating the opacity and artificiality of the surface. Offering
the promise of something more just as it reveals itself as a transient stage on the way to a
deeper knowledge—a knowledge that is promised but not necessarily disclosed—the image is
both generous and self-defeating.
The structure of the novel is tripartite, and it is ordered by two distinct lines of sight: Mason
and Dixon must chart two transits of Venus, one at the beginning and one at the end of the novel.
For a transit to take place, there must be two observations (“Obs”) made, as Mason describes:
“The further apart the Obs North and South, that is, the better. It is the Angular Distance between,
that we wish to know.” From this, “someone sitting in a room will succeed in reducing all
the Observations, from all ’round the World, to a simple number of Seconds, and tenths of a
Second, of Arc—and that will be the Parallax” (Pynchon 93). The transit is both a movement,
an arc or parabola, and a specific, measurable moment: the parallax. Just as the parallax is the
moment of convergence during the viewing of an autostereogram, the moment is both one of
expansion (what is seen is given sudden clarity) and reduction (all movement becomes a single
measurement, all divergent points of view become one, “reducing all”). The line from the precise
time and location of the transit to the observer on earth is referred to by one of the interlocutors
of the Rev. Cherrycoke, following Lacan, as “A Vector of Desire” (96); Venus, the embodiment
of love, is the object longed to be seen. Finally, she is: “she dropp’d, at last, full onto that mottl’d
bright Disk, dimm’d by the Lenses to a fierce Moot, that Eyes might bear” (99). To be mottled
is to be blotchy, incoherent: or patterned, marbled. Mottling might obscure or it might adorn;
like the wallpaper, pattern conceals deeper patterns, until the sudden shift into clarity resolves all
complexities.
The transits bookend the novel, which is arranged as an asymmetrical triptych. The first section
is titled “Latitudes and Departures”; the second, “America”; and the third, “The Last Transit.” If
we can imagine the two transits as the repeated parallel lines of image that need to be held, wall-
eyed, in the protagonists’ (and the reader’s) vision, then what emerges—the bit in between, the
occluded space in the middle, the secret held below—is perhaps America itself: it is the central
section, and the central subject, of the novel. It is then the angle of these different perspectives
that give us the triangulated view from which a vision of America can arise. Christy L. Burns
has argued similarly for a “parallactic method” with which to read the novel, arguing that the
parallactic “allows [Pynchon] a full and yet contentiously dialectical representation of ‘America’
as it was in the mid- to late-eighteenth century and as it is now” (1).5 Remembering that parallax
is also the moment of revelation during the viewing of an autostereogram, the parallactic method’s
hermeneutic capacity might be extended by the autostereogram’s disclosive potential.
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“What Arises from This?” 273
“Gaze Straight In”: Illusions of Depth
The autostereogram’s revelatory structure enacts a moment of quasi-religious epiphany, and
Pynchon consistently uses a vocabulary imbued with spiritual and supernatural wonder, as stargaz-
ing detects “a sort of Optickal Tension among the Stars, that seem’d ever just about to break
radiantly thro”’ (Pynchon 726). If only we are patient enough, we might witness this radiant
coming forth. And yet visual revelation is always fleeting, as Mason explains, “Have ye never
fall’n into one of those Cometary Dazes, with the way the Object grows brighter and brighter each
Night? These apparitions in the Sky, we never observe them but in Motion,—gone in seconds,
and if they return, we do not see them” (726). The cometary daze, like Mason’s “blurr’d and
strangely prolong’d Gaze” (70), is a visual indistinctness that here paradoxically results in the
vision, or “apparition.” The transience of the autostereogram means that while you might achieve
it, nevertheless if you shift, or drop your concentration (as Dixon explains, “its reflection once
acquired, to keep most faithfully fix’d upon it,—for like the glance of a Woman at a Ball, it must
be held for a certain time before conveying a Message” [287–88]), it might be “gone in seconds.”
The autostereogram provides a sense of being blessed by the ability to see something elusive, and
a scopophilic delight in seeing what is hidden.
In this sense, Pynchon depicts astronomy as a naturally autostereogrammatical discipline, with
Mason and Dixon as priests of the scopic, who see further—and perhaps deeper—than others,
and who must find both a way of interpreting their visions and of communicating them to the
laity. Mason is skilled at the trick, frequently experiencing a “curious optical readjustment” while
viewing the skies, whereby “The Stars no longer spread as upon a Dom’d Surface,—he now
beholds them in the Third Dimension as well,—the Eye creating its own Zed-Axis.” The eye’s Z
axis is its depth perception, and it is along this that the “star-chok’d depths near and far rush both
inward and away, and soon, quite soon, billowing out of control” (Pynchon 725). That the image
is “billowing out of control” reminds us that the image that emerges from an autostereogram is
dangerously unpredictable, and that the act of emergence itself contains a sense of the hazard of the
chance event: it is an emergency or an unforeseen event. The autostereogram’s latent emergency
might disturb; the hidden image might say anything; all, at this point, is possible. And yet, the
shift into clarity also gives us a paradoxical sense of the refusal of possibility:
“Whenever their circumstances, now uncertain and eventual, shall happen to be
reduced to Certainty.”
“Eh, that’s deep?! Reduced?”
“As if there were no single Destiny, but rather a choice among a great many
possible ones, their number steadily diminishing each time a Choice be made [: : : ]
much as a Lens, indeed, may receive all the Light from some vast celestial field of
view and reduce it to a single point—suggests an optical person.” (45)
Unmistakably, the moment of crystallization of the autostereogram is a narrowing of possibility.
The image that emerges could have been anything; the moment of its revelation is also the
removal of its mystery. “Optical people” are able—or are perhaps condemned—to reduce things
to certainty, and so the autostereogram, and its successful accomplishment, functions as a fantasy
of knowledge: the certainty it affords is a dangerous epistemological illusion.
One way in which the novel analyzes this fantasy is through an insistent emphasis on the
visible and the invisible, often depicted at the point of mutation, with an oscillation between
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274 Critique
the two constantly invoked. Vaucanson’s mechanical duck, who flies in and out of the narrative,
and for whom invisibility is identical with ontological power and autonomy, “shimmer[s] into
Visibility” (Pynchon 448). That which is “swelling, invisible, restless” (605) is ever-present;
usually, in Mason & Dixon, “something invisible’s going on” (478). The novel’s optical structure
provides an extension of Pynchon’s insistent theme of paranoia; what is unseen is unknown,
but it is also ontologically as well as visually incoherent: “Sometimes the Invisible will all at
once appear,—sometimes what you see may not be there at all” (486). This invisibility is also
epistemological, and identical with incomprehension: there is, we are told, “Nothing visible at the
fringes of readability” (731). Conversely, writing without readability becomes an image, like the
autostereogrammatic pattern before it has become meaningful: “There is writing on some of the
Structures, but Mason cannot read it” (771).
When things in this novel loom toward, or emerge out of, it is generally a progressive move
toward clarity and focus; “the ships grew slowly together, the l’Grand growing ever larger, smaller
details ever more visible” (Pynchon 52). The autostereogram understands vision as essentially
kinetic—something moves into visibility, into focus, in a way that echoes the linguistic register
of vision: things “come into view”; a picture “emerges,” giving us the kinetic potential of visual
revelation. Conversely, the Map-scape of Africa emerges but remains indistinct:
[T]he unreadable Map-scape of Africa had unaccountably emerg’d, as viewed from
a certain height above the pale Waves,—tilted into the Light, as a geometer’s Globe
might be pick’d up and tilted for a look at this new Hemisphere, this haunted and
other half of ev’rything known [: : : ] every detail, including the Invisible, set precisely,
present in all its violent chastity. (58)
This description of “this haunted and other half of everything known” reminds us of the dangers of
geographical monocularity. Mason & Dixon is a novel that understands that lines have presence,
whether they are immaterial or not; making one into two involves a physical othering of land
and people. Similarly, the image of the invisible as a “detail” that might be observed gives us,
rather than as absence, the invisible as a type of presence: it is “present in all its violent chastity.”
The image has violent corporeality; its presence is tangible, if reticent. It must give itself up to
the eye, dissolve its chastity in one potent movement, in an eroticized version of a model of
concealment that promises eventual revelation. The obscuring of the longed-for image is thus
positively charged, and confusion is productive, as we see when “the Sky is restor’d to its pitiless
Clarity” (463), where the starkness in the aftermath of the autostereogram’s retreat enacts visual
loss.
Trying to Scry in Ghost-Quartz: The Crytographic Mason & Dixon
The other half of everything known, then, is both the human and geographical collateral of
the force propelled by the slashes on the land, and what lies beneath the visible; here figured
as “haunted.” The autostereogrammatic model of trying to visually bring something into being is
about loss or its imminent possibility; any autostereogrammatical success is fleeting and unreal, and
we know that what we see is illusory. The autostereogram thus contains an ineffable, immaterial
trace—of its own immanent potential and potential loss. The ghost and the autostereogram, indeed,
seem explicitly elided in the novel, as when Mason and Dixon meet Jonas Everybeet, who is
particularly skilled at the viewing and interpreting of crystals. Jonas “has been trying to find
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“What Arises from This?” 275
what in his Calling is known as the ‘Ghost,’ another crystal inside the ostensible one, more or
less clearly form’d.” Jonas explains “‘Tis there the Pictures appear : : : tho’ it varies from one
Operator to the next,—some need a perfect deep Blank, and cannot scry in Ghost-Quartz [: : : ] the
Symmetries are not always easy to see : : : here, these twin Heptagons : : : centering your Vision
upon their common side, gaze straight in,—”’ (Pynchon 442). Scrying is the practice of looking
into something translucent with the belief that things will be seen; some can do it, some cannot.
Here again, then, is the visual ennoia, here named the Ghost, that, with a little patience, may
resolve itself, till the “Pictures” appear from the symmetries, “more or less perfectly formed.”
The secret picture haunts the visual space it should occupy, or, as Stefan Mattessich puts it in
his reading of the same passage, “[s]pace is the invisible world that dwells in matter” (236).
However, Jonas warns of the dangers of this privileged perception: “‘Others, before too much
Clarity, become blind to the other World” (Pynchon 442). The other world and this one, the
invisible and the visible, constantly threaten to invade each other, and the ability to see with
clarity might itself become a kind of blindness, or an excess of certainty. While rectitude in
the viewing of an autostereogram means exercising the ability to read the textual surface or the
emergent image, it also means falling for a trick. The novel is suspicious of pretenses to mastery
of all kinds, and the clarity achieved by the successful viewer of an autostereogram can be a kind
of didacticism (“reduced to Certainty” [45]), and puts her in danger of losing the ethical good of
a certain fuzziness of perception: the unfocused gaze induces an ability to see alternatives, or the
ability to exist alongside the subjunctive, the possible, and the as yet unfixed.
The autostereogram is cryptic, and cryptographic: it is encoded with a secret, one that requires
decryption, just as Mason says of astronomy: “the movements of the Heav’ns, which taken together
form a cryptick Message [: : : ] we are intended one day to solve, and read” (Pynchon 59). And
yet, as I have suggested, the autostereogram also provides a model for Pynchon’s preoccupation
with mourning: the suppressed image explicitly haunts the surface one, and it is usually an image
of haunting:Mason & Dixon is full of ghosts. Abraham and Torok’s influential account of the way
the self deals with traumatic experience offers a reinflection of the term crypt that articulates this
link between the decipherable, the encrypted, and the buried. The crypt for Abraham and Torok
is a space within the self that is constructed when something has been lost, “or more precisely”
has experienced “the ‘loss’ that resulted from a traumatism.” The crypt is “a sealed-off psychic
place [: : : ] comparable to the formation of a cocoon around the chrysalis” (Shell and Kernel
141). The crypt that entombs a secret is an occluded, veiled space created around a traumatic loss
that cannot be represented, or recognized, as a loss. It is a hidden, buried place, encrypted and
indecipherable. As Jacques Derrida asks in his foreword to The Wolf Man’s Magic Word, “What
is a crypt?” (xiv), a question he goes on to answer: “to disguise and to hide: something, always
a body in some way. But also to disguise the act of hiding and to hide the disguise” (xiv). The
crypt never contains the beloved object, but instead is a marker of the object’s absence: “What the
crypt commemorates, as the incorporated object’s ‘monument’ or ‘tomb,’ is not the object itself,
but its exclusion” (xvii).
Therefore, the crypt at the heart of the puzzle is also a site of haunting, and the double
significance of encrypted, latent meaning and a burial site is particularly appropriate to a reading
of Mason & Dixon, which oscillates between the decipherable and the encrypted, the interior and
the exterior, and the living and the dead. Abraham and Torok’s notion of the crypt means that
what is encrypted has no material presence, and instead is detectable only through its effects on
language, as what is suppressed emerges through the creation of cryptonyms, or magic words.
Theirs is, essentially, a theory of how to read that which has been rendered unreadable; as Tim
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276 Critique
Armstrong puts it, the crypt is “cloaked in a silence that disrupts the possibility of linguistic
expression itself” (63). The autostereogram functions precisely as a visual encryption, with the
surface pattern acting much like Derrida’s interpretation of the function of the crypt: “to disguise
and to hide [: : : ] but also to disguise the act of hiding and to hide the disguise.” In addition
to this interpretive distortion, autostereograms share with crypts their haunted status. The picture
contains a ghost: like a medium, the viewer must invoke the emergence of the shadowy, immaterial
secret, and might be its sole interlocutor. For Mason, the dead are imagined in visual terms: “They
were like Stars to him,—unable to project himself among their enigmatic Gatherings, he could
but observe through a mediating Instrument. The many Lens’d Rebekah” (Pynchon 195). Here
Rebekah herself, Mason’s much-mourned late wife, is figured as the object of multiple perspectives
on which a correct gaze might converge. For Rebekah, death is akin to being “held in detention”;
“shadowy, whispering, veil’d to be unveil’d” (57). In detention she is encrypted, locked away,
requiring a mediating instrument for interpretation.
The visual identities of Pynchon’s characters are frequently overlaid onto each other in a
form of autostereogrammatical haunting, in which multiple faces in the novel are revealed as
being inhabited by a likeness of the dead: Eliza is a “Point-for-Point Representation” of Rebekah
(Pynchon 536). Rebekah’s ghost is consistently figured as a recalcitrant autostereogram inscribed
on the face, as Mason describes the comet that he observes: “’tis a Face, though yet veil’d,
’twill be hers, I swear it, I stare till my eyes ache” (187). Similarly, Mason tries to search his
sons’ faces for hers, a memorialization described in terms of optical illusion: “he stares into his
Mirror memorizing his own face well enough to filter it out of Willy’s and Doc’s, leaving, if the
Trick succeed, Rebekah’s alone, her dear living Face,—tho’ at about half the optikal Resolution,
he guesses” (211). However, like the autostereogram, the trick’s success is fleeting: “When the
time comes, he finds he cannot remember what he looks like. Withal, their Faces are their own,
unsortably,—and claim the Moment” (211). The picture is haunted by the image it conceals,
and the picture that emerges from the autostereogram is ghostlike: the representation is pure
representation. Much like what emerges from the crypt, there are no material markers or physical
presence, just an “undecipherable fetish” (Wolf Man’s Magic Word 81), as Abraham and Torok
put it. It is ghostly because it is imbued with immanence; the autostereogram that has not “given
up” its hidden image is pregnant with potential representation, haunted by its own possibilities.
“Surfaces of Meaning”: The Autostereogrammatical Palimpsest
In Mason & Dixon, secrets, and secret powers, become encrypted through layering: is to
be hidden underneath, Pynchon asks, to be meaningful?6 Mason & Dixon demonstrates how
layers and complexity might become readable, might offer up their meaning to an attentive or
skilled reader or spectator, or equally, might refuse to. As Kathryn Hume has pointed out, in
Pynchon’s novels “we find repeated views from above, achieved by humans or by supernatural
or technological forces. We also experience views from below” (“Views from Above” 630).
The emphasis on vertical perspective is given new significance by the autostereogram, as depth
perception is equivalent to the revelation of new realities or metaphysical manifestations, just as it
is in the novel: “What Mason sees, from his first Nightfall there, is Darkness rising up out of the
sea, where all the carelessly bright day it has lain, as in a state of slumber [: : : ] whilst at Dawn,
that same Darkness, almost palpably aware of his Regard, appears to withdraw, consciously, to a
certain depth beneath the Atlantick Surface” (Pynchon 107). Movement along the vertical axis is
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“What Arises from This?” 277
expressed in visual terms. Daniel Punday has linked the two, arguing that “the association between
vertical distance and visibility is constant throughout Mason & Dixon” (266), demonstrating the
ways in which Mason & Dixon’s oscillation between the vertical and horizontal marks Pynchon’s
evolving representation of ghosts. The space “below” the earth, indeed, contains life: “in Reality,
we live upon a Map. Perhaps even our Lives are but representations of Truer Lives, pursued above
and below” (Pynchon 442). A concern for those who live their lives below permeates the text;
one of the repeated, talismanic lines of the novel (and will later also be of Against the Day) is the
hermetic tag “as above, so below.” The idea that “in Reality, we live upon a Map” articulates the
possibility of the illusion of depth’s sudden revocation, disclosing the knowledge that the surface
is all there is.
Josephine McDonagh has written that the palimpsest, like the autostereogram, merely offers
a simulacrum of depth: “it feigns a sense of depth whilst always in fact functioning on the surface
level” (211), and the palimpsest provides a useful figure for the kind of layering that is necessary
for any autostereogrammatical structure. The “Endless strata” of the palimpsest offer us underlying
and overlying layers like sediment, a metaphor for history and memory disguised as an optical
illusion. Consequently, Sarah Dillon has described the “fantasy of the palimpsest,” which leads
to a “radical disjunction within the notion of [: : : ] the present” (10). The presence of “the past,
present (and possibly the future) in the palimpsest does not elide temporality, but evidences the
spectrality of any ‘present’ moment which always already contains within it ‘past,’ ‘present’ and
‘future’ moments” (10). Mason & Dixon’s analysis of history assents to this conflation, and the
protagonists’ recourse to the figure of the palimpsest is overlain with chronological disruption, as
Mason acquires a dagger called a Krees, with its “tiny scratches, uncleansable Stains, overlie one
the other in a Palimpsest running deep into the Dimension of Time” (Pynchon 72). Layers are
thus able to accrete secret power: “alternating Layers of different Substances are ever a sign of
the intention to accumulate Force” (599).
The palimpsest in Mason & Dixon also offers us a version of the autostereogram that mingles
the scopic with the linguistic: “‘The printed Book.’ Suggests the Rev’d, consists of ‘—thin layers
of pattern’d Ink, alternating with other thin layers of compress’d Paper, stack’d often by the
Hundreds”’ (Pynchon 390). And so the book itself is disclosed as an object of our vision as much
as of our comprehension, compared to the layers involved in croissant-making, gold-beating, and
lamination. With its “Sheets innumerable.” but consisting nevertheless of “pure Surface” (389),
these physical manifestations of compressed layers disclose an autostereogrammatical paradox,
which, in the case of the book, gives us a sense of textual rather than visual surface complexity.
The palimpsest contains (artificial) depths that must be squinted at before they discharge their
readable prose, and where things that arise from or out of these depths are similarly liable to
become “immerg’d” (738), to sink down out of reach. Writing is presented as an accumulation of
traces, as a marker of what has gone before, rather than primarily as signification. The palimpsest
thus provides us with the trope of the text as archaeological, as the product of, as Michael Davidson
has put it, “the gradual accretion and sedimentation of textual materials, no layer of which can
ever be isolated from any other” (79).
The figure of the palimpsest in Mason & Dixon is archaeological and spectral in nature:
Over Wearside, here at Nightfall [: : : ] when the spirits also are said in these parts to
come out,—so beneath them now do the Dark-Age Maps, the long dogged Roman
Palimpsest, the earlier contours of Brigantum itself, emerge at a certain combination
of low Sun-angle and Scholarly Altitude above the Fell,—coming up through the
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Spoil-heaps and the grazing, in colors of evening, in Map-makers’ ink-washes, green
Walnut, Weld, Brazil-wood, Lake, Terra-Sienna, Cullens-Earth and Burnt Umber,—as
Emerson meanwhile points out to his flock the lines of the Roman baths and barracks
and temples to Mithras, the crypts in which the mysteries were pass’d on to novices,
once long ago invisibly nested at the Camp’s secret core. (219)
Here the multicolored autostereogrammatical image emerges-under certain conditions-as a palimpsest
of settlements from different eras. The model of visual emergence is here accompanied by
ghosts and overlaid with the compression of time and history that the palimpsest implies, but
it also contains those “crypts [: : : ] invisibly nested at the Camp’s secret core.” Hanjo Berressem
has elaborated an interpretation of Pynchon’s technique that seems sympathetic to an autostere-
ogrammatical reading, when he writes of his “kind of pointilism, [where] the imagination creates
immaterial ‘surfaces of meaning’ and ‘sheets of time’ from the unconnected and instantaneous
multiplicity of material matters-of-facts” (172). The “kind of pointilism” of the autostereogram
creates these surfaces of meaning. Mason & Dixon’s radical questioning of the notion of historical
progress, and its subversion of linear history (where the dark ages, Mithraic crypts, Roman Britain,
the 1760s, and the 1960s can all meet and mingle), means that “sheets of time” are also what are
held in abeyance by the palimpsestual autostereogram, ready to emerge “at a certain combination
of low Sun-angle and Scholarly Altitude.”
This radical questioning of the notion of historical progress, where Mason and Dixon’s task
of scientifically exact surveying is conflated with the Dark-Age Maps and the “contours” of
Brigantum itself, throws into uncertainty any sort of traditional hierarchy between Enlightenment
rationality and what it seeks to master. The potential violence of the line that Mason and Dixon
must draw is articulated by Emerson, in one of the novel’s many warnings about the ethical dangers
inherent in their task: “The Romans were preoccupied with conveying Force, be it hydraulic, or
military, or architectural,—along straight lines” (Pynchon 219). Lines are essentially immaterial
things, which can be violent and which can enclose, and the dangers of enclosure, both on the
horizontal and vertical axes, are one of the things that the novel warns us of, and this knowledge
offers us the possibility that what has been traumatically encrypted or buried, throughout history,
is the land itself. The line that Mason and Dixon draw on the earth is a mark, a visual signifier
(the visto), as well as a physical entity, a “conduit for Evil” (701), a historical turning-point, and a
violent affront to unbounded nature. In Mason & Dixon the Romans are explicitly associated with
lines, and therefore with Mason and Dixon’s topographical mission. The “long dogged Roman
Palimpsest” implies it is one of the readable or quasi-readable images that emerges from the crypt
of history; a crypt created by a geographical trauma inflicted by the Romans on the land. All
attempts to map are equally aggressive and are linked to the growth of capitalism, as both are
drawn as paradigmatic assertions of power: “Markets appearing, with their unwritten Laws, upon
ev’ry patch of open ground, power beginning to sort itself out, Line and Staff” (281).
The line, therefore, is often read as the central metaphor ofMason & Dixon. It is my contention
that the text is, however, equally preoccupied with plural lines: while single lines are implicated in
the trope of the violent event that enacts encryption, parallel lines are associated with interpretation,
textuality, and parallax. Thus, and remembering the wave-like grain of the wood, or the repeated
columns of flowers on the wallpaper, parallel lines provide a sense of the decipherability or
otherwise of what is held latent in the autostereogram or is buried in the crypt. A recurring group
of words in the novel are those arising from the morpheme “plex.” Complexity, multiplexity, and
often just the archaic and obscure plexity all recur multiple times. The trees, we are told, are
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“gone to Pen-Strokes and Shadows in crippl’d Plexity, bath’d in the declining light [: : : ] Down
the Hill-side, light in colours of the Hearth was transmitted by window-panes more and less
optikally true” (193–94). The “crippl’d Plexity” of “Pen-strokes and Shadows” provides a sense
of a state of indistinctness and unreadability: here we have images that have not attained the status
of words, pure signification, like the disturbances in the textual field that arises from the encrypted
object. Here, though, the untrustworthiness of the communicative medium is visual rather than
linguistic: “more or less optikally true.” Later, “the entire plexity of possible journeys” (505) is
conjured, and at the close of the novel, Mason considers “Plexities of Honor and Sin.” America
is “perplexing” (522), and as always “[t]here is a love of complexity, here in America” (586).
Plexity always, specifically, concerns the intertwining of parallel lines. Plexity, according to
Leonard Talmy, is a “quantity’s state of articulation into equivalent elements” (176)—one element
is thus uniplex; many elements are a multiplex; things are complex when they contain two or more
independent elements. From the Latin plectere we also get plaitedness and ply; if the trees have
gone to crippled plexity, they have become intertwined with age, like straight lines crossing each
other, rendering them unreadable. As the wood grain was laminar, non-intersecting, and readable,
plexity is fatal to the decipherability of an autostereogrammatical image, because parallel lines
are what we need for parallax to occur. Trees are usually imagined as parallel lines, “whereby
Messages may be extracted from Lines of Text sacred and otherwise [: : : ] their unspoken intention
that the Numbers nocturnally obtain’d be set side by side, and arrang’d into Lines, like those of
a Text, manipulated till a Message be reveal’d” (Pynchon 479). Even sausages are described as
“hang[ing] against the sky, forming Lines of Text, cryptick lntestinal Commentary” (289). Lines
of text are cryptic because they resist easy signification; they are unreadable, an image of opacity,
pattern without meaning. They must be “manipulated” before they reveal their message. The
autostereogram discloses a disturbance to our categories of interpretation: it self-reveals, with a
seeming degree of autonomous agency, and our efforts to read might be fruitless. Pynchon contrasts
visual pattern made readable, whether trees, sausages, or wallpaper, with language and text that is
unreadable, that must be manipulated or decrypted before it signifies. Mason & Dixon traces the
efforts we make to effect signification where it is not possible, and it shows how attempts to read
displaced shards of meaning are destined to failure, even as we know the content of the crypt is
absence itself. What the cryptographic reading offers the autostereogrammatical is the knowledge
that what is hidden, suppressed, buried, or latent in the text is ineffable for the reader just as it is
for Mason and Dixon, held below like Mithraic mysteries.
A State of Emergency
This essay has argued that Mason & Dixon is haunted by the figure of the autostereogram and
is explicable, in part, by its elucidation. The figuring of the novel as an autostereogram necessitates
the reading of it as an encrypted text, which may or may not prove decipherable, a reading that
seems particularly compatible with a text as full of secrets, mysteries, and hauntings as this one-
nevertheless, the autostereogrammatical model does raise the question: What is concealed within
the text-as-image? The essay initially posited that a vision of America itself is perhaps the cryptic
third element in that autostereogrammatical structure, implied by the arrangement of the novel’s
sections. The idea of America as an emergent visual image or immaterial presence, one that must
be read or interpreted to fully emerge, does indeed permeate the text. Early in the novel, Mason
glimpses, in a barroom debate about tax, “something styling itself ‘America,’ coming into being,
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280 Critique
ripening, like a Tree-ful of Cherries in a good summer, almost as one stands and watches” (405)
where Pynchon figures the emerging, mutating image via time-lapse photography. As he grows
old, “America draws back from the edges of Dixon’s frame” (754), as if he cannot quite hold
it in his vision any longer. Later still, Dixon asks Mason: “What could that be? What Phantom
Shape, implicit in the Figures? ‘’Tis a Construction,’ Mason weakly, ‘a great single Engine, the
size of a Continent. [: : : ] Not all the Connexions are made yet, that’s why some of it is still
invisible [: : : ] soon becoming visible” (772). The cryptic nature of the autostereogram, pattern
concealed by pattern, is limned here as a shadowy vision of America, “Implicit in the Figures.”
In the process of moving between opacity and clarity, America, “an old Continental hope” (772),
is as yet unfixed. It is, in the 1760s, still to be fully articulated. This state of indeterminacy is
equivalent to the unbounded land before the completion of the Mason-Dixon line; a boundary
dispute indicates negotiation between two lines of sight, but it also means that the land is subject
to a hermeneutic freedom: it is not perceptually owned or encompassed by any single vision.
Pynchon describes America as a subjunctive space: “Does Britannia, when sleeps, dream?
Is America her dream? [: : : ] serving as a very Rubbish-Tip for subjunctive Hopes, for all that
may yet be true” (345). The thing that will turn America from “subjunctive to declarative,”
“reducing Possibilities to Simplicities” is that it will be “seen and recorded, measur’d and tied
in” (345), a process in which Mason and Dixon are hopelessly implicated, even as they try to
occupy ethically generous ground by means of their resistance to certainty; eventually, they, too,
are “optical people.” Stefan Mattessich makes a similar point when he articulates “[Mason &
Dixon’s] resistance to reading (or seeing)”—a resistance to reading is akin to resistance to the
same moment of simplification that clarity invokes. He writes that “what gets lost in this resistance
is a time deeper than memory and thus an immemorial space (Pynchon calls it ‘America’) that
does not ever appear except insofar as it alters reading (perception)” (240). Pynchon’s depiction of
America as an “immemorial space,” Mattessich argues, consists of “a history, a continuing legacy,
a haunting” (240). America itself occupies a haunted space; she has herself been encrypted by
the traumatic acts of enclosing, bounding, mapping, and dividing.
Furthermore, Mason describes “[America] ‘—Which, as if in answer to God’s recession,
remain’d invisible, denied to us, till it became necessary to our Souls that it come to rest,
self-reveal’d, tho’ we pretended to ‘discover’ it”’ (Pynchon 486). The anti-colonialist gesture
performed by “America [: : : ] self-reveal’d”—it was not discovered—is a correlative of the au-
tostereogrammatical metaphor: to self-reveal is what an autostereogram does. America, until its
self-revelation, is here described as being in recession: a recess is where things yet to emerge
hide. Simon Critchley and Tom McCarthy have noted that “[r]ecession, then, is temporal and
spatial: an interval at once legislative and sacred” (41). Recession is also “an end that guarantees
a new beginning” (42), as the word implies its own end, and in doing so emphasizes its own
status as temporary: it is conscious of its own imminent loss and its own potential rebirth. In
Mason & Dixon, America is often conceptualized as recessional: “America, withal, for centuries
had been kept hidden, as are certain Bodies of Knowledge. Only now and then were selected
persons allowed Glimpses of the New World” (Pynchon 487). Similarly, “[t]his ‘New World’
was ever a secret Body of Knowledge,—meant to be studied with the same dedication as the
Hebrew Kabbala would demand. Forms of the Land, the flow of water, the occurrence of what
us’d to be call’d Miracles, all are Text,—to be attended to, manipulated, read, remember’d”
(487). Mason and Dixon’s task, “to mark the Earth with geometrick Scars” (257), simultaneously
conjectures signification out of a “perfect deep Blank” (442) and articulates a moment of loss.
America is an encrypted body of knowledge, which must be read through the forms appearing
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“What Arises from This?” 281
on its surface, “coming up through the Spoil-heaps and the grazing” (219): the geographical is
graphical.
It is also clear here that the emergence of America, like the revelation of the image in the
autostereogram, is akin to something holy. When the autostereogram works, it is like a blessing,
to the elect few who “can”: you either get it or you do not. The patience that is necessary for this
revelation is, in the novel, often recast as grace, as Dixon the Quaker reflects: “Howbeit, ’tis all
Desire,—and Desire, but Embodiment, in the World, of what Quakers have understood as Grace
: : : ? That inspires a ‘great Turning,’ a ‘direct experience of Christ”’ (Pynchon 101). This great
turning is explicitly the point of convergence: “the Promise of Man, the redemptive Point, ever
at our God-horizon, toward which all Faiths, true and delusional, must alike converge!” (356):
the redemptive point on which we must converge is the moment of revelation. But, crucially,
this moment is also about loss. Just as Venus is love, and her elusiveness an object lesson in
the perfect autostereogram—“we want things embodied, emerging, a perfect return” (690) Mason
muses—nevertheless, one cannot hold an image forever. Instead, just “like Dreams just at the
Crepescule, ’twill all vanish, unrecoverably” (630). America might be the secret encrypted body
of knowledge (Derrida: “always a body in some way”) that we desire, but we try to read her, or
keep her, at our peril.
Mason & Dixon, and Mason and Dixon, offer us a model of creative bifocularity, where the
depth below the surface appears to have disclosed its occluded image. However, this reading is
subverted explicitly by the text in its insistence on making that clarity’s epistemological and ethical
dangers its subject. Instead, in Mason & Dixon, the unreadability of the disclosed secret must
be maintained—the contents of the crypt cannot be represented directly: in the sky are written
“Messages of Great Urgency to our Time, and to your Continent” (772), but the “Spectres in
the Sky” (753) to which Mason and Dixon have devoted their lives must remain undeciphered.
Instead, what the autostereogrammatical reading offers us is an articulation of the visual longing
and epistemological desire that the optical illusion represents, and the dangers of trying to impose
certainty of interpretation onto the fuzziness of the world. As Michael Wood has argued, “Human
Incompletion” (129) is what the novel suggests America needs to remember: a state of being
open to possibility, of continual becoming, or, as the autostereogram would suggest, America
as a state of emergency. Mason and Dixon, whose task might have rendered them incapable
of being sympathetic to this aim, nevertheless understand that meaning resides in immanence
and potential, and in the refusal of definitive signification. Remembering that what reveals itself
at the moment of convergence is not just America but the “Promise of Man” (Pynchon 356),
before the mapping, measuring, and the parallax sharpen things to exactitude, America is latent,
and subjunctive; without all the “Connexions [: : : ] made yet” (772), she is able to escape the
determinacy of vision and, subsequently, definition. Inevitably, though, the loss that Mason &
Dixon understands as inherent in the movement from the subjunctive to the declarative, and from
visual indistinctness to clarity, will predominate, as the novel mourns that which “fails to return,
is ever a source of Sorrow” (630).
Notes
1From the early to mid-1800s, physicists such as Charles Wheatstone had been interested in stereoscopes, where the
images are recombined through the use of mirrors or lenses. The autostereogram, though, is self-contained: you can do
it yourself, with no need for external devices or equipment. The first was created by Christopher Tyler in 1979, laying
the groundwork for the craze for “magic eye” pictures (as the autostereogram became known commercially) that took
place in the UK and America in the eighties and nineties. It is likely to be relevant that Thomas Pynchon started work on
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282 Critique
Mason & Dixon as early as January 1975 (see Gussow), and the novel was eventually published in 1997, spanning the
period during which the autostereogram came to prominence.
2Pynchon’s novels relentlessly return to themes of hidden knowledge and order coming to light with sustained
attention, and so the autostereogram is a natural figure for his work. Charles Hollander has written about The Crying of
Lot 49 and “magic eye” pictures, using the latter as a metaphor for Pynchon’s concealed Cold War narrative. However,
as a figure of concealed knowledge, the Magic Eye might offer us a way into the novel, but it must be an imposition:
when Pynchon wrote The Crying of Lot 49, in contrast to the period during which he wrote Mason & Dixon, there were
no autostereograms.
3J. J. Long opens up the possibility that bifocularity is itself one of the things that Mason & Dixon suggests we
have lost since the Enlightenment:
Single-point monocular perspective, for example, is far from being a natural mode of perception: human
vision is binocular, has no vanishing point, is unbounded, in constant flux, and fades at the edges. But
Renaissance perspective is such a powerful representational convention in the West that its conventional
status is often forgotten: it appears natural. (49)
4Kwinter describes Kafka’s aesthetic as flat, and writes that “‘[f]lat,’ of course, does not mean a diminished or
impoverished dimensionality” (129). On the contrary, “what we have here [is] a prodigious but constant level of complexity
at every scale” (129). I am arguing for a similar attention to the complexity of surface in Mason & Dixon.
5For more on Pynchon’s parallelism, see Mitchum Huehls, who writes that “Pynchon employs a temporally parallactic
narrative form (different narrators deliver the story from ostensibly different moments in time)” (25).
6Critics of Mason & Dixon have frequently explored this figure of layering in the book: Kathryn Hume’s essay
argues for layering as one of the two dominant structural principles of the novel, Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds suggests in
her introductory essay “The Times of Mason & Dixon” that layers are the key to Mason & Dixon’s temporal structure—
that it “fictionalizes less than it layers a postmodern sensibility onto a near-factual eighteenth century” (13)—and Stefan
Mattessich also echoes this sense: “The ingenuity of Mason & Dixon is that to read it well is almost necessarily to provoke
the ’ghost’ of a spatiality that disappears beneath our interpretative tools” (240).
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